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Abstract 
Although there are strong grounds to expect that perspective taking deficits are associated 
with anger arousal following an interpersonal provocation, there has been little research 
directly testing this hypothesis. In this study, 636 volunteers were asked to rate their likely 
reactions to two brief video representations of potentially anger arousing social 
transgressions. Results confirm the relationship between dispositional perspective taking and 
the likelihood of anger arousal following an interpersonal provocation. Perspective taking 
was also predictive of trait anger (negatively) and of the means of control and expression of 
anger. Associations between personal distress and anger measures indicate the possible 
influence of the intensity, regulation, and direction of emotion on anger. 
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1. Introduction  
Although the emotion of anger has been the subject of increasing theoretical analysis 
and clinical application in the last 15 years, the empirical literature investigating the nature of 
anger remains relatively scant, particularly when compared with the published literature on 
other negative emotions such as anxiety and depression (Kassinove, 1995). At the same time, 
the clinical application of existing theoretical models of anger has burgeoned, arguably at a 
faster rate than the fundamental research required to support such an application. For 
example, anger is widely considered to be a potential contributing factor to aggression (e.g., 
Novaco, 1994; Novaco, 1997), and comparative studies suggest that prison inmates, violent 
offenders in particular, score higher on measures of anger experience and expression than 
other members of the community (Mills, Kroner, & Forth, 1998; Spielberger, 1991). One of 
the ways in which anger management programs aim to help offenders and other participants 
to act less aggressively is by changing the ways in which they perceive interpersonal 
provocation. Perceptions of another’s provoking behaviour are reframed in treatment in ways 
that are thought to be less likely to lead to angry cognitions and arousal. What is less well 
understood is the way in which individual differences, such as perspective taking, influence 
those interpretations of behaviour that lead to anger arousal.  
The term ‘‘perspective taking’’ is used here to denote the tendency or ability of an 
individual to consider a situation from another’s point of view and has been distinguished 
both theoretically and empirically from affective or emotional empathy (Davis, 1980; Hogan, 
1969). Davis (1983a) has provided the most widely accepted definition of perspective taking 
as ‘‘the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others’’ (pp. 
113–114; see also Bernstein & Davis, 1982; Davis, 1980, 1983b; Davis, Hull, Young, & 
Warren, 1987; Davis & Oathout, 1992), implying that perspective taking is a skill that 
involves a number of cognitive processes. In his original validation work, Davis (1980, 
1983a) differentiated perspective taking from other possible empathic responses that have 
been documented in the literature (e.g., Hoffman, 1978; Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, 
Hansson, & Richardson, 1978) including empathic concern (emotional empathy), personal 
distress (proneness to negative affect when exposed to arousal inducing situations such as 
emergency situations), and fantasy (the capacity for imaginative involvement in fictional 
situations).  
4 
 
Perspective taking skills might inhibit angry responses to provocation in at least two 
ways. First, they might inhibit anger arousal directly by decreasing the likelihood that 
provocations will be perceived in ways that lead to blame. A number of studies have 
investigated the importance of the types of attributions and appraisals made in potentially 
anger provoking situations. Ferguson and Rule (1983) suggested that the attributions an 
individual makes when involved in an interpersonal interaction can mediate his or her 
subsequent anger experience and anger related reactions. They argued that in interpersonal 
interactions in which an individual has in some way been harmed, he/she undertakes 
attributional work to understand whether what occurred was the result of behaviour from the 
other person that was accidental or deliberate, foreseeable or unforeseeable, and malevolently 
or non-malevolently intended, in creating a causal framework of events. McAuley and 
Shaffer (1993) reported the implication of external attributions of control in the generation of 
anger. Smith and colleagues have argued for the explanatory power of the appraisals 
individuals make of a situation and their central meaning (core relational theme) in emotional 
experience. According to this model, the appraisal of an event as important and interfering 
with personal goals and of the other individual in an interaction as accountable for the event 
underlies the core relational theme of other-blame that elicits the experience of anger (Smith 
& Lazarus, 1993; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). The relevance of attributions of 
hostile intent and subsequent evaluations of blame for subsequent anger experience and 
angry-aggressive behaviour are well established for both adults and juveniles (Dodge & 
Schwarz, 1997; Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 1999).  
More recent empirical work has demonstrated that in situations involving 
interpersonal transgression, perspective taking ability tends to lead to more relationship 
enhancing outcomes such as forgiveness. Zechmeister and Romero (2002) found that 
participants who forgave others following situations when they felt angered or hurt were 
more likely to exhibit perspective taking in their narratives. Forgiveness within this study was 
associated with lower state anger as well as lesser attributions of responsibility and 
deliberateness to the actions of the other individual (see also Konstam, Chernoff, & Deveney, 
2001). This suggests that perspective taking leads to a series of assessments that result in 
inhibition of more negative responses in favor of more relationship restoring behaviour. 
Moreover, an empathic set may be associated with a shift in attributions for another’s 
behaviour – more situational and less dispositional – to resemble more closely those 
attributions individuals make for their own behaviour (Regan & Totten, 1975).  
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A second way in which perspective taking might inhibit anger arousal is in terms of 
the ability of high-perspective takers to maintain a high level of cognitive functioning when 
aroused by an interpersonal provocation. Richardson, Green, and Lago (1998) have reported 
experimental support for this process, placing their findings within Zillmann’s (1988) 
cognitive excitation theory of anger, which suggests that arousal in response to a threat 
interferes with higher level cognitive functioning and thereby weakens inhibition against 
aggression. Zillmann (1983) suggested that, at extreme levels of arousal, the ‘‘cognitive 
mediation of behaviour is expected to be greatly impaired’’ (p. 94). Likewise, Tyson (1998) 
has suggested that high-levels of anger can result in cognitive systems ‘‘being overwhelmed’’ 
(p. 145). This explanation is also consistent with Baumeister’s (1990) work on self-regulation 
breakdown, which suggests that under certain conditions, such as a state of negative affective 
arousal, individuals experience a state of cognitive deconstruction characterised by a 
disengaging from the self-system.  
If it is accepted that perspective taking deficits may contribute to the likelihood or 
intensity of anger in response to a provocation, it is also conceivable that perspective taking 
deficits influence anger arousal differently according to different contexts or types of 
provocation. For example, the effects of perspective taking on anger may be more 
pronounced in situations that are more cognitively complex: for example, situations where 
intent is ambiguous. This suggestion is consistent with the findings of Hazebroek et al. (1999) 
that differences between individuals high and low in trait anger in anger aroused by a 
provocation and blaming of the provoker were greater in situations where the intent of the 
provoker was more ambiguous. Similarly, it can be argued that the effects of differences in 
perspective taking will be more apparent when the intent of a provoker is more ambiguous, 
and thus more open to interpretation.  
The aim of this study was to examine the links between perspective taking and anger 
arousal following interpersonal provocation at differing levels of ambiguity of intent. It was 
hypothesized that greater individual differences in perspective taking ability would predict 
lesser anger following an interpersonal provocation. The relationship of perspective taking to 
trait anger and the way anger is experienced was also examined. 
 
2. Method  
2.1. Participants  
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A sample of 636 South Australian undergraduate student volunteers (382 female, 248 
male, 6 of unknown gender) of an Adelaide university participated in the study. The mean 
age of participants was 22.84 years (SD = 7.29; Range = 17–57).  
 
2.2. Design and procedure  
The study employed two experimental conditions (low vs high-ambiguity); within 
each condition, participants watched two video-taped vignettes of interpersonal events – the 
first in a car park, the second in a bar – involving a possible anger provocation. After each 
vignette, respondents completed measures of attributions, anger related appraisals, and self-
reported anger in response to that vignette. Participants also completed measures of trait 
anger, anger expression, anger control, and empathy. Groups of participants were randomly 
assigned to either the low-ambiguity or high-ambiguity condition; voice-over narration to the 
video-tapes provided instructions and elementary explanations of the events depicted.  
 
3. Materials  
3.1. Video vignettes  
Interpersonal provocations were depicted in four video vignettes involving two events 
(a social transgression in a car park, and being kept waiting in a bar) presented at each of two 
levels of apparent intent (low and high-ambiguity). All vignettes were filmed from the point 
of view of an unseen protagonist, so that the camera served as the eyes of the participant. 
This approach was designed to minimise reliance on a participant’s ability to take the 
perspective of a character in a film.  
The car park vignette, of approximately 45 s duration, was previously used by 
Hazebroek et al. (1999), though with a different narrator. It depicts waiting for a car to leave 
a parking space, which is subsequently abruptly occupied by a white van with a male driver. 
In the high-ambiguity version, the driver – who is seen in profile in both versions – does not 
look toward the camera; in the low-ambiguity version, the driver performs a rude one-finger 
gesture as the vehicle comes to a halt. The bar vignette, of approximately 90 s duration, 
depicts waiting to be served at a quiet bar while a barman polishes glasses at the far end of 
the bar. In the high-ambiguity version, the bartender does not look toward the camera from 
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the commencement of the scene until he approaches it at the scene’s conclusion; in the low-
ambiguity version, he looks toward the camera for several seconds in the middle of the wait, 
but continues polishing glasses until his approach at the scene’s conclusion. 
 
3.2. Measures relating to the vignettes  
3.2.1. Attributional and appraisal questions  
For each vignette, participants provided ratings of the extent to which they attributed 
cause, controllability, and intent to the other. They also rated their agreement with appraisals 
that ‘‘it was only a small thing’’, ‘‘it was not what I expected’’, ‘‘it was obvious who/what 
was responsible’’, and ‘‘I don’t blame the [other]’’. These items were designed to address, 
respectively, the appraisal components of importance, interference with personal goals, and 
accountability and the core relational theme of other-blame considered important to anger 
(Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Smith et al., 1993). The attribution of intent served also as a check 
for the experimental manipulation of ambiguity. All items employed 7-point rating scales.  
 
3.2.2. Self-reported anger  
Self-reported anger in response to a vignette was measured by means of an 8-item 
scale. The items addressed similar responses to those of the State Anger scale of 
Spielberger’s (1999) State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-2), but differed from 
that scale in that they were expressed in terms of anticipated, rather than present, feelings. 
Examples of items are ‘‘I would feel furious’’ and ‘‘I would feel like hitting something’’. 
These items employed 4-point response scales from not at all to very much so. 
 
3.3. Trait measures  
The Trait Anger, Anger Expression, and Anger Control scales of the State-Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999). The State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory-2 is a 57- item self-report measure which assesses state anger, trait 
anger, and styles of anger expression and control. All but the State Anger measure were 
administered. The Trait Anger scale (T-Ang) measures an individual’s general propensity to 
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experience anger and its concomitant components over time. Alpha coefficients above .80 
were reported in normative data collection (Spielberger, 1999).  
The Anger Expression and Anger Control scales measure the individual’s 
characteristic style of responding to the experience of anger. The Anger Expression-Out scale 
(AX-O) assesses the frequency of outwardly-expressed behaviour when angered, while the 
Anger Expression-In scale (AX-I) assesses the frequency of suppression of anger experience. 
Higher scores on these scales are indicative of more maladaptive responses to anger. By 
contrast, the Anger Control scales measure more constructive approaches to the handling of 
anger: The Anger Control-Out scale (AC-O) assesses the respondent’s control of outward 
anger expression, and the Anger Control-In scale (AC-I) assesses the respondent’s ability to 
use calming techniques when angered. Alpha coefficients reported by Spielberger (1999) for 
the anger expression and control scales in normative data collection ranged from .73 to .93. 
All items employed 4-point rating scales from almost never to always.  
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). The Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (Davis, 1980) is a 28-item self-report scale that measures four components of 
dispositional empathy. The Perspective Taking (PT) scale assesses the individual’s tendency 
to adopt the perspective of other people and to see things from their point of view. The 
Empathic Concern (EC) scale assesses the individual’s tendency to experience feelings of 
sympathy and concern for others. The Fantasy (FS) scale assesses the tendency of individuals 
to involve themselves imaginatively in fictional situations and to identify with fictitious 
characters. The Personal Distress (PD) scale assesses the tendency to experience feelings of 
anxiety and panic in emergency or emotional interpersonal situations. In Davis’s (1980) 
original validation study, alpha reliability coefficients for all scales were reported to be above 
.70. All IRI items employed 5-point rating scales from describes me very well to does not 
describe me well. 
 
4. Results  
Preliminary data-screening led to the identification and removal of 15 multivariate 
outliers by Mahalanobis distance, with p < .001, and 4 univariate outliers (z > 3.29). All 
outliers had self-reported anger scores of 32 – the scale maximum – for one or both scenarios, 
apparently due to frivolous responding; their removal resulted in approximately normal 
distributions on these variables. The remaining 617 cases were included in subsequent 
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analyses, subject to minor omissions necessitated by missing data. Cronbach’s alpha 
reliabilities exceeded .71 for all scales, including self-reported anger: .79 (car park) and .84 
(bar). Table 1 shows sample means and standard deviations of all individual difference scale 
scores. Members of the two experimental groups did not differ by age or household income, 
though women were under-represented in the low-ambiguity condition; gender was 
controlled for in all subsequent analyses. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.1. Attributions, appraisals, and manipulation check  
The effect of the manipulation of ambiguity was assessed by two-way (condition, 
gender) ANOVAs. There was a significant effect for the manipulation for both car park, 
F(1,603) = 35.52, p < .0005, and bar scenarios, F(1,606) = 412.61, p < .0005 on ratings of 
the likelihood of having been ‘‘seen’’ by the provoker. Partial correlations, with ambiguity 
condition and gender controlled for, were calculated for each IRI subscale score and each 
attribution or appraisal (averaged for the two scenarios). Only three of the 24 correlations 
were significant: Perspective taking was significantly positively correlated with not blaming 
the other (r = .17, p < .001) and with viewing the incident as a small thing (r = .20, p < 
.001), and personal distress had a significant negative association with the latter variable (r = 
.13, p < .001); alpha levels were set at .002 by Bonferroni adjustment for the number of 
analyses.  
 
4.1.1. Self-reported anger  
Self-reported anger (SRA) scores for the two scenarios were summed and used as a 
dependent variable in a multiple regression analysis with the four IRI subscale scores, age, 
gender, and ambiguity as predictors at the first step. The analysis explained 8.2% of 
population variance, F(7,599) = 8.83, p < .0005. The subsequent addition of a term for the 
interaction of perspective taking (mean centered) and ambiguity did not significantly increase 
variance explained, F(1,598) = .26, and the interaction term did not significantly predict 
SRA, t = .51. Table 2 shows the results of the hierarchical multiple regression. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2. Anger scales  
The prediction of respondents’ dispositional responses to anger was addressed in five 
standard multiple regression analyses. Trait anger, anger control-in, anger control-out, anger 
expression-in, and anger expression-out were each regressed onto the four IRI subscale 
scores, age, gender, and ambiguity: the latter to control for any possible influence of 
experimental condition on responses to the dispositional measures. Table 3 shows the 
standardized regression coefficients and model statistics.  
In all cases except anger expression-in, perspective taking was the strongest predictor 
of anger score. Perspective taking was negatively associated with trait anger and anger 
expression (in and out) and positively with anger control (in and out). Personal distress, the 
strongest predictor of anger expression-in, was significantly associated with each anger score 
bar anger expression-out, the direction of association being opposite to that of perspective 
taking in each case. The associations for fantasy were in the same direction as those for 
personal distress, but were only significant for trait anger and anger expression (in and out), 
and empathic concern had a significant association (negative) with anger expression-in only. 
Of the remaining variables, increasing age was associated with more anger control-in and less 
anger control-out and being male was associated with more anger control-out and anger 
expression-in. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5. Discussion  
The findings of this study confirm the relationship between dispositional perspective 
taking and the likelihood of anger arousal following an interpersonal provocation. 
Participants with a lesser tendency to take the perspective of others reported higher levels of 
probable anger in response to both scenarios presented: being cut off for a parking space by 
another driver and being kept waiting for service by a bartender. To the extent that people’s 
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reports of their probable actions correspond to their actual response tendencies, these findings 
suggest a clear link between perspective taking and anger as a response to a provocation. 
Although participants registered significantly higher self-reported anger scores in response to 
the less ambiguous provocation, there was no indication that the effect of the individual 
difference variable was more pronounced when intent was ambiguous (Hazebroek et al., 
1999). The absence of such an interaction suggests that perspective taking may exert a 
general rather than a conditional inhibitory effect on anger. As indicated by the associations 
with appraisal and attribution items, that effect may include the assignment of less 
importance to a provocation and less blame to an antagonist.  
The potential importance of perspective taking to the understanding of anger was 
further illustrated by the emergence of that variable as a prominent predictor of both trait 
anger and manner of anger expression and control. The tendency to take another’s 
perspective was associated with a lesser inclination to anger, a lesser inclination to the 
expression of anger – either by lashing out or by bottling it up – and a greater inclination to 
the control of anger: both the feelings and the urge to express them. The overall picture thus 
painted of individuals who are relatively indisposed to viewing matters from another person’s 
standpoint is of individuals who are more likely to feel affronted and to blame the 
transgressor, more prone to anger and, when it happens, more inclined to act it out or be 
troubled by it.  
The effects noted for perspective taking should also be considered alongside those of 
the other IRI subscales. Empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasy scale scores were 
included in the analyses primarily to enable us to differentiate the effects of perspective 
taking from those of other manifestations of empathy, although fantasy – the tendency to 
identify with fictitious characters in films and other media – had an additional justification in 
allowing us to control for individual differences in participants ability to imagine 
experiencing the events depicted in the scenarios. The significant positive association of 
fantasy with self-reported anger appears to confirm some dependence of the scenario method 
on a viewer’s imagination for its effect. A similar effect for personal distress on self-reported 
anger suggests the tendency of that measure to tap emotional intensity. In predicting scores 
on the anger scales, the effects of personal distress and fantasy, where significant, were again 
in the same direction and opposed to those of perspective taking. The association of fantasy 
with trait anger and anger expression-in appears to be consistent with observations linking 
fantasy to susceptibility to emotional responding (Davis, 1983a), though the possibility that 
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the dispositional anger responses were themselves influenced by reactions to the scenarios 
cannot be discounted. The effects for personal distress can be summarised as a greater 
propensity for anger and its internal expression and a lesser propensity for control of angry 
feelings and the urge to express them. Overall, the effects observed for personal distress on 
self-reported anger and the dispositional anger measures are consistent with the depiction of 
that variable as associated with emotional intensity, a relative lack of emotional regulation 
(Eisenberg et al., 1994), and an inward focus (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997).  
Of equal interest are the effects of the emotional analogue of perspective taking, 
empathic concern. The fairly weak negative association of empathic concern with anger 
expression-in complements that of perspective taking and is therefore relatively 
unremarkable. Elsewhere, the effects of empathic concern provide no grounds for a belief 
that the importance of emotional empathy might approach that of cognitive empathy in the 
prediction of anger.  
The effects noted for the other IRI subscales help to place those of perspective taking 
in context. Although effect sizes were generally small, perspective taking was associated with 
the strongest effects on four of the five trait measures of anger related responses and the 
measure of self-reported anger. As well as establishing a link between perspective taking and 
anger, the findings point to this cognitive variable as a possible moderator of angry reactions 
to a transgression, although the accuracy with which self-reported anger represents actual 
responding is not known. The findings are not, however, able to cast much light on the likely 
mechanics of the link between perspective taking and angry responding. Perspective taking 
was not associated with attributions of cause, controllability, or intentionality of a 
transgression and was only weakly associated with the tendency to downplay its significance 
and to withhold blame. This pattern of associations offers little support for the view that the 
effects of perspective taking on anger are likely to be substantially mediated by attributions 
and appraisals of the anger provoking stimulus. The question of underlying mechanisms 
clearly requires more detailed study. 
 
6. Conclusions  
The relationship of perspective taking to self-reported anger in response to a social 
transgression, to trait anger, and to the expression and control of anger is likely to be of 
interest to those involved in the design and delivery of interventions to reduce anger related 
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aggression. At present, perspective taking deficits are probably addressed to some degree in 
the cognitive biases component of anger treatment, where unrealistic and invalid, anger 
inducing cognitions and appraisals become the focus for change. Indeed, asking a question 
such as ‘‘How might another person have seen this situation?’’ is a common technique in 
cognitive behavioural therapy for undermining habitual and dysfunctional patterns of 
thinking. Perspective taking deficits per se, however, are rarely the focus of sustained 
therapeutic attention. The possibility that highly angry individuals might find being asked to 
shift perspective an unfamiliar and difficult task suggests that developing techniques to 
enhance perspective taking skills should be a high priority for the future development of 
anger treatments.  
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Table 1  
Means and standard deviations of scale scores  
Scale Mean Standard deviation 
IRI fantasy 16.60 5.39 
IRI personal distress 11.73 4.71 
IRI perspective taking 17.67 4.63 
IRI empathic concern 19.94 4.59 
STAXI-2 trait anger 20.03 4.91 
STAXI-2 anger expression – in 17.55 4.48 
STAXI-2 anger expression – out 16.50 3.74 
STAXI-2 anger control – in 21.25 4.75 
STAXI-2 anger control – out 22.31 4.64 
 
Table 2  
Hierarchical multiple regression for the prediction of self-reported anger  
Predictors B S.E. (B) β t 
Main effects only     
Intercept 16.13 1.24  13.07*** 
Age -.02 .02 -.03 -.71 
Gender -.38 .39 -.04 -.98 
Fantasy .09 .03 .11 2.58* 
Empathic concern -.01 .05 -.01 -.30 
Perspective taking -.20 .04 -.21 -4.80*** 
Personal distress .08 .04 .09 2.16* 
Ambiguity 
condition 
1.28 .35 .15 3.68*** 
     
Main effects + 
interaction 
    
Intercept 17.11 2.28  7.52*** 
Age -.02 .02 -.03 -.74 
Gender -.38 .39 -.04 -.98 
Fantasy .09 .03 .11 2.59* 
Empathic concern -.02 .05 -.02 -.33 
Perspective taking -.25 .11 -.27 -2.26* 
Personal distress .08 .04 .09 2.13* 
Ambiguity 
condition 
1.28 .35 .15 3.67*** 
PT – ambiguity 
interaction 
.04 .07 .06 .51 
* p < .05.  
** p < .005.  
*** p < .0005. 
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Table 3  
Multiple regression statistics for the prediction of anger scale scores 
 Trait Anger β AC-I β AC-O β AX-I β AX-O β 
Predictors      
Age -.04 .14*** .01 -.07 -.14** 
Gender -.05 -.07 -.17*** -.12* .04 
Fantasy .15*** -.01 -.05 .11** .10* 
Empathic 
concern 
-.02 .06 .08 -.14** .03 
Perspective 
taking 
-.26*** .26*** .29*** -.10* -.29*** 
Personal 
distress 
.16*** -.14** -.18*** .25*** .08 
Ambiguity 
condition 
.00 -.01 -.03 -.01 .06 
Model 
statistics 
     
Adjusted R
2
 
 
.12 .14 .15 .14 .12 
F 13.01*** 15.02*** 16.44*** 14.65*** 12.42*** 
Note: AC-I, Anger Control-In; AC-O, Anger Control-Out; AX-I, Anger Expression-In; AX-O, Anger 
Expression-Out. From the state-trait anger expression inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999). 
* p < .05.  
** p < .005.  
*** p < .0005 
 
 
 
 
 
